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Abstract 
This paper distinguishes various ways in which language can act on our affect or emotion 
experience. From the commonsensical consideration that sometimes we use language merely to 
report or describe our feelings, I move on to discuss how language can constitute, clarify, and 
enhance them, as well as induce novel and oft surprising experiences. I also consider the social 
impact of putting feelings into words, including the reciprocal influences between emotion 
experience and the public dissemination of emotion labels and descriptions, and how these 
influences depend on the power of labelling to make complex feelings visible and thus easily 
accessible. Finally, I address and reinterpret some psychological findings on the so-called “verbal 
overshadowing” effect. 
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What language does to feelings 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Language is an important tool for interpersonal communication, but not only. As Clark (1998; 
2008) has argued, for example, language can be seen as a way of extending our minds into the 
world, a “scaffolding” that enhances our cognitive capabilities. In this paper I want to explore a 
further way in which language transforms our minds—in particular how it acts on our feelings, i.e. 
our “affect” or subjective experience of emotion.1 
I shall not deny that language often merely reports, or describes, pre-existing specific 
feelings. I shall not deny either, however, that putting one’s feelings into words often changes them, 
in ways that I will try to specify below. These two claims need not be mutually exclusive, and this 
paper does not aim at defending one particular view of the relationship between language and 
affectivity. Rather, the main goal of this paper is to identify and distinguish between the many ways 
in which language acts on our feelings.  
To this purpose, I will draw on various different sources—from psychotherapy, to 
phenomenology, to cognitive and affective science, and more. In some cases, I will appeal to 
existing research to illustrate a specific way in which, in my view, language impacts on affect. In 
                                                
1 In what follows I will use the terms “feelings”, “affect”, “affective experience” and “emotion 
experience” as synonyms, to refer to the phenomenological-experiential aspect of emotion (for a 
different use, and the argument that “feelings” is a broader experiential category than emotion 
experience, see Ratcliffe, 2008). I will use the term “emotion” to refer to a broader phenomenon 
that encompasses affect, as well as non-conscious subpersonal neural and bodily events, and/or 
expression and behaviour (my terminology is thus similar to the one proposed by Damasio, 2003).
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other cases, when evidence is meagre, I will myself propose ways in which further research could 
be carried on to support a specific point.  
The resulting account will be one in which language, from allowing the organism merely to 
report how it feels (section 2), is gradually shown as also individuating, clarifying and enhancing its 
affective experience, in its individual and social dimension. Specifically, I will discuss how 
language is used by the talking organism as a self-exploratory tool in order to make its feelings 
explicit and more precise (section 3), and also how it can serve as an “external device” (i.e. external 
to the skin) to induce novel and/or surprising emotion experiences (section 4). I then will move on 
to consider explicitly the social impact of putting feelings into words, in particular the “looping 
effects” at play between emotion experience and the public dissemination of emotion labels and 
descriptions (section 5), and how these looping effects may depend on the power of language easily 
to “condense” complex feelings into words, thus making certain experiences more visible than 
others (section 6). Finally, I will discuss the intriguing phenomenon of “verbal overshadowing”, 
reinterpreting it in a way consistent with the view developed in the rest of the paper (section 7).  
 Before starting, a caveat. Language is of course a very complex and multi-layered 
phenomenon; by discussing what it does to our feelings, I will not always refer to the same 
elements of language. Sometimes I will say “language” to mean individual words (spoken or 
written); other times I will refer to actual attempts to label one’s feelings, and/or to “bring them out” 
via verbalization; still other times I will refer to conversations between two or more people. Also, 
the distinctions I will draw below apply as much to individual words as to rhetoric forms (such as 
metonymies, metaphors, etc.).2 I hope that this loose usage of the term “language” will not come 
across as too distracting or imprecise, and that it will be clear enough, in every single case, which 
features of language are being discussed.   
                                                
2 See Kövecses (2000), for example, for many of the metaphors that English speakers (and not only) 
commonly use when talking about emotions.  
   
 
4  
 
2 Simply reporting 
 
In the philosophy of art, some discussions of the relationship between expression (including 
linguistic expression) and emotion experience have defended the view that the latter is constituted 
by the former, suggesting at the same time that this view is at odds with the claim that feelings can 
be individuated before expression, and that language sometimes merely reports or describes them. 
For example, in The Principles of Art (1938), Collingwood wrote that ‘until a man has expressed 
his emotion, he does not know what emotion it is. The act of expressing it is therefore an 
exploration of his own emotions. He is trying to find out what these emotions are’ (p. 111). For 
Collingwood, expression individuates and clarifies, whereas description classifies, generalizes, and 
thus makes language frigid and inexpressive—which is why a genuine poet never names the 
emotions he is expressing (p. 112).3 According to Sue Campbell (1997), expression, and recognition 
of the expressive gesture on the part of others, are necessary to individuate one’s own feelings; 
‘[n]either you nor I have any reason to believe that I desire to quit smoking, if I never, at any time, 
engage in any action that could be so interpreted’ (p. 48).4 
As I shall discuss in the next section, I think it is true that putting one’s feelings into words 
can clarify what one is feeling, and thereby constitute and change one’s experience. It seems 
however undeniable that, sometimes at least, what we do when we talk about our feelings is simply 
                                                
3 Similar claims can be found in Dewey (1934, esp. chapter 4). 
4 Campbell (1997) notes that accusations such as “You are too emotional!” target someone’s 
emotional nature or character, not just a “style” of expressing one’s feelings; she argues that these 
types of accusation work this way precisely because we take one’s expressive style as constitutive 
of one’s feelings. Her point is that it would be hard to make sense of these accusations if feelings 
were taken to be individuated  already before expression.  
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report something that we have been experiencing up until then, without thereby changing such 
experience. I can think of situations in which I felt jealous or annoyed at someone, for example, and 
decided to communicate my feelings only after some time and hesitation. Even Austin (1962), who 
otherwise famously emphasized the performative aspect of language, granted that ‘since our 
emotions or wishes are not readily detectable by others, it is common to wish to inform others that 
we have them’ (p. 78). Reports might be more or less accurate and sincere, depending on how much 
we want to “let out”, as well as how apt to the task one’s expressive resources are. In many cases 
language will be poorer than the experience—as when one communicates one’s anger with a tame 
“I am annoyed at you” while repressing a more complex mix of rage and resentment, perhaps 
accumulated over time. The point of reporting one’s experiences is often, of course, not simply to 
describe them, but also to induce a reaction in the listener, to explain or justify one’s own 
behaviour, to release oneself from a burden, to clarify one’s own feelings to oneself, etc. Yet these 
are further aims and/or consequences of talking about one’s feelings, whose existence does not 
seem to me to undermine, or prove wrong, the commonsensical consideration that we often put into 
words experiences we had before expressing them.5 
Recent findings on the brain and bodily bases of emotion experience are consistent with this 
view. Although it is still unclear how subpersonal neural and bodily processes relate to feelings, 
there is increasing consensus that at least some emotions can be differentiated at the brain and 
bodily level (see the discussions in Cacioppo et al., 2000; Levenson, 2002; Murphy et al., 2003; 
Phan et al., 2002), with studies showing the temporal unfolding of several dimensions of 
physiological arousal during emotional episodes (e.g. Alaoui-Ismaïli et al., 1997; Christie & 
                                                
5 This point is not affected by Wittgenstein’s (1953) private language argument. The point is not, in 
fact, that words like “anger” get their meaning from referring to some private internal feeling. I 
shall assume throughout that when I describe my experience as one of “anger” I am using a word 
whose meaning I have learnt through intersubjective interactions. 
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Friedman, 2004; Collet et al., 1997; Gomez & Danuser, 2007; Sinha & Parsons, 1996), and studies 
suggesting that feelings co-vary with brain and bodily changes (e.g. Damasio et al., 2000; Lane et 
al., 1997; Vianna et al., 2006; see also Damasio, 2003, for discussion and further references). 
Research by Panksepp (1998) suggests that a number of affects in all mammals are underpinned by 
specific patterns of neurochemical activity; both he and Damasio (2003) have argued that affect 
depends on the state of the whole organism, and that different feelings depend on different 
configurations of brain and bodily activity. 
So, although we do not know exactly how emotion experience relates to organismic activity, 
and although we are certainly not aware of all the processes going on in our organism at any given 
time, the available evidence shows that our organism, and that of other animals, can realize various 
patterns of activity before (or without) linguistic expression. It also suggests (although more work 
needs to be done in this area) that these patterns co-vary with one’s feelings, and so it does not 
contradict the claim that what I shall call affectively specific emotions (namely, emotions 
experienced as specific feelings) are possible prior to verbalization—and, therefore, that language 
can, and often does, merely describe these experiences.6 
  
                                                
6 But see Rolls (2008) and LeDoux (2008) for the (admittedly speculative) suggestion that some 
“higher-order” symbol-manipulating capacity is necessary for lower-order emotional processes to 
be consciously experienced. These authors would not deny that emotions can be felt prior to or 
without language, but would deny that organisms that lack brain systems for the “syntactic 
manipulation of symbols” can have affective experiences. I do not intend to tackle the hard problem 
of consciousness here, so all I will say is that I would rather endorse a different, “enactive” view of 
consciousness according to which living organisms possess primordial, non-reflective forms of self-
consciousness (such as “sentience”) in virtue of their specific organizational structure (for extended 
discussion, see Thompson, 2007; see also Damasio, 1999, 2003). 
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3 Clarifying and constituting 
 
As mentioned, however, I think it is true that in many cases putting one’s feelings into words can 
clarify and thereby change them. Exactly in which sense, however, is not easy to say. Collingwood 
(1938) suggests that before expression there is only a ‘crude emotion of the psychical level’ (p. 
274), namely an undistinguished urge or charge to express oneself; engaging in artistic expression 
(including verbal expression) constitutes a process of self-exploration that, as Collingwood puts it, 
transforms this initially undistinguished urge into a specific conscious experience.  
  This point can be made clearer, I think, by saying that putting one’s affect into words is a 
way of becoming aware of, or making explicit, a pre-reflectively lived experience. The latter is 
usually characterized a state of awareness that is not (yet) reflected upon, and that requires effort in 
order to be made explicit (see Petitmengin, 2006). On this interpretation, Collingwood’s “crude 
emotion at the psychical level” is a pre-reflective feeling that artistic expression, including 
verbalization, helps to bring at the level of reflective awareness.  
One way to characterize a pre-reflective feeling is as an affective experience that permeates 
one’s consciousness and that colours one’s experience of the environment, but that is not congealed 
or fixed into a bounded (some would say “categorical”) state of awareness. As Petitmengin (2007) 
points out, various notions have been proposed that gesture at this pre-reflective level of 
affectivity—such as Gendlin’s “felt sense”, Stern’s “vitality affects”, and Damasio’s “background 
feelings”. The first notion, discussed by Gendlin in the context of his so-called “focusing-oriented” 
psychotherapeutic method, refers to an experience of significance that is (still) unclear and felt 
somewhat “at the edge” (Gendlin, 1996). A felt sense, Gendlin suggests, is a somatic experience in 
that it is felt within the body; it is not however a specific bodily sensation (such as the perception of 
one’s heartbeat), but rather a physical way of experiencing a situation (op. cit., p. 19). A felt sense 
can be experienced in certain parts of the body (stomach, chest, throat) more than in others, but it 
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remains at the same time oriented towards the world. A felt sense is thus best characterized as 
experienced with or through the body (as in Ratcliffe, 2008). In the course of a focusing-oriented 
psychotherapy session, the therapist helps the client become increasingly aware of felt senses, and 
eventually taps on this growing awareness to help the client change her experiences and behaviour.  
According to Stern (1998), the experiential world of infants involves traditional categorical 
feelings, a well as a variety of kinaesthetic-somatic-affective experiences, such as feelings of being 
touched in a certain way, feelings of movements around her, and feelings of affective attunement 
(or lack thereof) to the caregiver. Stern calls these feelings “vitality affects” and compares them to 
Damasio’s (1999) “background feelings”, namely feelings of being alive that constantly accompany 
all our experiences and that, on Damasio’s theory of consciousness, depend on second-order neural 
processes constantly monitoring the activity of our body. Petitmengin (2007, p. 58) perceptively 
remarks that it is when we do not find the words to describe it, that this pre-reflective affective 
dimension of experience is most apparent; it is not reflective yet, but it is clearly present to one’s 
awareness, as something meaningful but still nebulous.7  
 When a pre-reflective feeling becomes explicit or reflective by being put into words, it 
changes in the sense that it acquires precision (Petitmengin, 2007, p. 74). According to Depraz et al. 
(2003, p. 70), verbalization contributes its own ‘quality of intuitive evidence’ to an experience, 
                                                
7 As Petitmengin (2007) emphasizes, pre-reflective lived experiences are fuzzy. This fuzziness 
should not be confused with meaninglessness or absence of what I call affective specificity. An 
emotion experience can in fact be pre-reflective and affectively specific at the same time. A state of 
depression, for example, need not be reflected upon in order to feel different from a state of elation; 
the difference, I would argue, lies in how one is pre-reflectively aware of the world and of oneself 
in it. As Gendlin (1996, p. 17) puts it, a felt sense, especially when just tapped, is unclear and 
nevertheless ‘very definite’, with ‘its own unique quality’. 
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namely an ‘expressive fulfilment or completion’. Importantly, verbalization has its own dynamics 
that influences the unfolding of the experience, in a process of mutual constraints: ‘[p]utting into 
words happens in successive layers which complete themselves, which bring forth complements, 
details, layers of meaning that each new reduction gives birth to’ (Depraz et al., 2003, p. 71); 
‘[e]xpression not only makes [experience] more precise, but makes it evolve, enabling us to 
discover new aspects of it’ (Petitmengin, 2007, p. 74). As Gendlin (1996) puts it, when in the 
course of a psychotherapy session a client comes in touch with a felt sense, then a further step can 
be taken by letting this felt sense “move forward”, namely expand and show the client the new 
possibilities of experiencing that it can engender. 
Note that the discussion so far implies that the view that language (and expression more in 
general) is constitutive of one’s affect is not incompatible with the one that feelings can be 
individuated before expression, and that language can merely report or describe them. Emotions, as 
argued in the previous section, can be affectively specific prior to expression (even Collingwood, 
1938, at some point claims that ‘[t]he anger which I feel here and now, with a certain person, for a 
certain cause, is no doubt an instance of anger, and in describing it as anger one is telling the truth 
about it’; p. 112); putting feelings into words can, however, induce a movement from the pre-
reflective to the reflective, which changes the experience and adds a sense of fulfilment. In this 
sense, verbalization is indeed constitutive of experience.  
This “compatibilist” position is held also by Depraz et al. (2003). They first describe an 
early stage of formation of one’s experiences that does not depend on verbalization, i.e. the “basic 
cycle of the reflecting act”; this cycle emerges from the interplay of two processes: the epoché, and 
“intuitive evidence”. On their account, the epoché is accomplished in three phases (see op. cit., p. 
25): suspension of the ‘realist’s prejudice that what appears to you is truly the state of the world’; 
redirection of attention from the “exterior” to the “interior”; and ‘letting-go or accepting your 
experience’. Through these phases, the epoché allows various pre-reflective material to become 
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conscious, i.e. to move from a ‘foggy’, ‘misty’ and ‘confused’ (p. 37) state, to one in which more 
specific experiences come to awareness and are accepted as such by the subject. It is however via a 
process of “intuition” that what has come to awareness congeals or settles into a meaningful form 
(for details, see pp. 43-63). Intuition as they understand it ‘has nothing to do with symbolic 
knowledge, be it logical or discursive’ (p. 44). It is a dynamic process in which one’s awareness 
strives to ‘come forth’ (p. 50), and can suddenly reach a feeling of completion.  
Then they move on to discuss, among other things, the relationship between experience and 
expression, and verbalization in particular. The basic cycle of becoming aware can be accomplished 
without verbalization and ‘simply lead to something that remains unsaid. We can easily imagine 
that you can live out this experience of reflection as complete in itself, that you cannot put it into 
words, or even that you have no intention of expressing it’ (op. cit., p. 65). Yet this consideration 
does not prevent verbalization from being constitutive of experience. What verbalization does, as 
we saw, is contribute its own ‘quality of intuitive evidence’, i.e. a further sense of fulfilment, an 
‘expressive fulfilment or completion’ (p. 70) this time, lived through as one puts one’s experiences 
into words. Thus for Depraz et al. verbalization operates on experiences that are already formed at 
the level of the “basic cycle”, such that from their reciprocal fine-tuning new, further individuated 
experiences can eventually emerge. 
Linguistic expression can be constitutive of affect also in the sense that it is yet another form 
of bodily activity that contributes to the shaping of one’s feelings. Speaking is (also) something a 
human organism does with her body, like dancing, gesturing, grimacing, screaming, singing, etc. If 
affect, as science suggests, depends in its nuances on the state and activity of the organism, then 
speaking can have an effect on it as any other such activity; and we can then agree with Campbell 
(1997, p. 50) that expression is the bodily articulation of one’s feelings, and that ‘[t]he richer and 
more discriminating our ways of expression, the richer and more nuanced our affective lives’.  
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4 Enhancing 
 
Becoming aware of one’s feelings and labelling them can enhance them, in at least two senses. 
First, once we are clearer about what we feel, we may allow ourselves to experience our emotions 
in their fullness and indulge in them; we may let ourselves behave accordingly, thus enhancing 
them further. 
Second, language can enhance affect also in the sense that it can “externally” induce 
experiences that would otherwise not occur. This is probably why many of us enjoy reading novels 
and poems. But writers themselves do sometimes try to let words “take the lead”, so to say, in order 
to come up with something novel that will induce unexpected feelings. The Surrealists famously 
adopted various techniques to achieve this goal. One was the method of “automatic writing”, which 
consisted in writing as rapidly as possible following associations of ideas, in order to free the 
creative process from the constraints of conscious will. This technique could produce fortuitous 
juxtaposition of terms, from which, as Breton wrote in the first Manifesto (1924), ‘a particular light’ 
could spring, ‘the light of the image, to which we are infinitely sensitive’ (p. 32, emphasis in 
original). Breton gives a poignant description of what spontaneously generated poems can do to the 
mind; he talks of a ‘dizzying race of images [that] appear like the only guideposts to the mind’ 
(ibid.) and continues,  
 
[b]y slow degrees the mind becomes convinced of the supreme reality of these images. At 
first limiting itself to submitting to them, it soon realizes that they flatter its reason, and 
increase its knowledge accordingly. The mind […] goes forward, borne by these images 
which enrapture it […] (op. cit., p. 33) 
 
An even more “aleatoric” technique was the game of the so-called “exquisite corpse”, in 
which various participants, in turn, added a word to a piece of folded paper without seeing the 
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others’ contributions. This technique can generate surprisingly fine verses (or even poems) evoking 
peculiar affective atmospheres, as in the famous verse which gave the method its name: le cadavre 
exquis boira le vin nouveau (“the exquisite corpse will drink the new wine”).  
Surrealist writers would have probably loved “spoetry”, i.e. poetry made from spam, or… 
automatic writing automated! (See http://poemsmadefromspam.blogspot.com/). All these 
techniques exploit the capacity of language to act on the mind like a drug, by boosting and/or 
moulding one’s affect in novel ways (incidentally, Breton explicitly claimed that Surrealism acts on 
the mind like a drug). Using language in this way is not unlike using other forms of technology—
from old-fashioned novels to MP3 players—to act on our emotion experience and explore new 
possibilities for feeling. 
The claim that language can enhance affect is an empirical hypothesis. Support for it could 
come, for example, from a better understanding of alexithymia, a disorder of personality that 
literally means “lack of words for feelings”—from the Greek a- (prefix meaning “lack”), lexis 
(“word”) and thymos (“feelings”). The term was originally coined by Sifneos (1972, pp. 81-2) in 
order to describe the difficulty, manifested by some psychosomatic patients, to use words for 
describing their feelings. The disorder is little understood, but some works suggest that alexithymic 
subjects have difficulties identifying their feelings, in the sense that they are confused about which 
emotion it is they are experiencing; also, they seem to be relatively unaware of changes in their 
feelings (see Bagby et al., 2006). Some studies also mention stiff bodily postures and facial 
expressions associated with alexithymia (for a useful overview, see Sveneaus, 1999). It would be 
interesting, then, to study whether these patients could come to identify and experience new, richer 
and/or stronger feelings if they learnt a richer vocabulary for affect,8 and also whether a richer 
                                                
8 Sifneos (1972) remarks in passing that alexithymic patients only parrot back the terms that the 
therapist gives them, and don’t understand their meaning. It would be interesting to try to verify this 
comment more rigorously. 
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language could enhance other bodily means of expression. One could also study the effects of 
language on subjects who, for various reasons, are low in emotional granularity (e.g. Barrett, 2004), 
namely tend to report their affect coarsely along a pleasure-displeasure dimension, rather than 
differentiate between individual experiences such as fear, anger, sadness, disappointment, 
exhilaration, etc. If low emotional granularity is an index of a rather undifferentiated affective life, 
then again it would be interesting to find out whether training subjects to report emotions in a more 
specific, more “granular” way, would also transform their experience, as well as induce 
physiological differentiation. The idea, in other words, would be to exploit the transformative power 
of language to enhance people’s affective life—very much like the transformative power of music is 
used in music therapy, as well as everyday life, to enhance patients’ emotion experience, and to 
entrain and thereby structure their expression and physiology (DeNora, 2000). 
 
5 Looping effects  
 
A further way in which language can act on affect is by contributing to the construction of 
ecological niches in which specific behaviours and experiences can thrive. As Hacking (e.g. 1999) 
has argued, humans are interactive kinds, namely kinds that are influenced by the way they are 
classified and that influence what they classify (as opposed to indifferent kinds, like e.g. stones, 
which do not change as a consequence of how they are classified). The public dissemination of 
labels and descriptions of possible behaviours opens up modalities of existence that people 
eventually take up, enact, or even reject; and as people change their behaviour, labels and 
descriptions change accordingly: ‘People classified in a certain way tend to conform to or grow into 
the ways that they are described; but they also evolve in their own ways, so that the classifications 
and descriptions have to be constantly revised’ (Hacking, 1995b, p. 21; see also Hacking, 1995a, 
pp. 366-70). This “looping effect of human kinds”, as Hacking calls it, is apparent in the case of 
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mental disorders, which appear, proliferate, and disappear in part as a consequence of which 
descriptions and classifications are available (Hacking, 1995b, 1998, 1999).  
Hacking’s (1995b) detailed study of multiple personality illustrates this phenomenon in all 
its complexity. For a start, he notes that the American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) has 
offered criteria for multiple personality since the seventies, while in 1992 the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD), predominantly used in Europe, still did not have a separate 
category for multiple personality.9 In North America, and not in Europe, a “multiple personality 
epidemic” exploded in the 1970s. Only ten years before this explosion, the phenomenon was rare; 
yet ten years later, in the early nineties already, ‘there were hundreds of multiples in treatment in 
every sizeable town in North America’ (Hacking, 1995b, p. 8). Hacking suggests that factors 
responsible for the spreading of multiple personality, in addition to diagnostic criteria, had been the 
increasing attention paid to it by popular TV shows and other forms of media in the nineteen-
seventies—such as, for example, the bestselling “multibiography” (and then movie) Sybil, published 
in 1973. Sybil contributed to making multiple personality known to the wide public, and many of 
the facts reported by Hacking illustrate looping effects. For example, in the book, Sybil has several 
alters, two of which are male; as Hacking remarks, ‘after Sybil the floodgates were open to 
transsexual alters’ (op. cit., p. 77) and the number of alters diagnosed in multiples increased 
substantially, going from only two or three, to dozens. Influence in the other direction is seen in the 
fact that, as the number of alters increased, the name of the disorder itself underwent a 
transformation, and in 1994 it was changed from “Multiple Personality Disorder” (DSM-III) to 
“Dissociative Identity Disorder” (DSM-IV) (as such it still appears in DSM-IV-TR, published in 
2000). Perhaps the proliferation of alters made it increasingly difficult to keep track of different 
                                                
9 It still doesn’t; in ICD-10 (2007) there is only one entry (and no description) for “multiple 
personality” within the subgrouping “other dissociative disorders” (see F44.8), itself part of the 
broader grouping “dissociative [conversion] disorders” (F44). 
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personalities: ‘[i]nevitably the more alters that are elicited, the more they seem to be mere 
personality figments’ (Hacking, 1995b, p. 27); and changes in name and classification, if Hacking is 
right, will have further effects on the behaviour of the people classified. One of the first things to 
change is the therapy. In fact, Hacking reports that as the emphasis shifted from multiple 
personality to dissociated identity, therapists changed their focus and, rather than treating alters as 
separate personalities, they aimed at reintegrating them into one.  
These and several other data and considerations in Hacking’s study illustrate his point that 
mental disorders can be moving targets: when a mental disorder is classified and thus “pinned 
down”, the classification influences the people it classifies; people’s behaviour changes as a 
consequence, so that at some point the classification needs to be modified, and so on.10 
What about emotion experience and associated behaviours? To my knowledge, no work to 
date has explored the relation between emotion talk, feelings and behaviour in the details required 
to reveal interesting looping effects. A study in this direction is William Reddy’s (2001) analysis of 
the events that led to the French Revolution, the subsequent years of the Terror, and the Napoleonic 
dictatorship. In his view, the French Revolution was largely the product of changes in emotion 
expression that began around 1650 with the development of sentimentalism. Sentimentalism played 
a major role in favouring and enhancing the expression of feelings between people. In depicting 
emotions as manifestations of people’s moral goodness, it did not simply allow free expression of 
feelings; it also recommended it as a proof of one’s moral status: ‘public expression of intense 
feeling, rather than causing embarrassment, was a badge of generous sincerity and social 
connectedness’ (p. 164). Sentimentalism spread via novels and visual arts and, Reddy argues, came 
to transform emotion expression in the private as well as political sphere.  
                                                
10 See also the (shorter and more speculative) discussions of mental retardation, schizophrenia and 
autism in Hacking (1999) and the study of fugue, a “transient mental illness”, in Hacking (1998). 
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One way in which Reddy illustrates this process is by reporting and discussing fragments of 
love letters of two people who then became political activists in the years of the Revolution, Jeanne-
Marie Phlipon and Jean-Marie Roland (see op. cit., pp. 166-9). The language of these letters echoed 
the one of sentimentalist novels, and often referred to maxims and principles of sentimentalist 
ideology. Sentimentalist tones and ideas also influenced policy debates, the writings of many 
radicals, and official records. The extremes of the Terror, Reddy suggests, were the consequence of 
sentimentalism’s emphasis on “natural feelings”, and of his Manichean tendency to divide people 
into naturally “good” or “evil” ones. 
Reddy’s historical approach is grounded on the view that how one expresses one’s emotions 
in language changes the speaker as well as the interlocutor. He uses the term “emotive” to refer to a 
particular kind of speech act which has a ‘self-exploratory or self-altering effect’ (p. 101); as he 
points out in his analysis of Phlipon’s and Roland’s letters, the authors used rhetorical devices that 
did not simply describe feelings, but aimed at eliciting a response, in the interlocutor, which would 
validate the virtuous nature of such feelings. This attitude set up the conditions for a Hacking-esque 
looping effect; ‘the more intense it [= the expressed feeling] was, the more likely to be natural and 
good. This conviction could make possible a kind of vicious circle, a kind of escalation of intensity, 
as individuals fine-tuned emotives in search of a natural elevation of sentiment’ (Reddy, 2001, p. 
169).  
Reddy’s study, one may object, fails to show that there is a privileged link between 
sentimentalism and expression of feelings in the subsequent dramatic political events. Given 
Hacking’s lesson, however, I think we can at least grant Reddy his more general point about the 
historical method, namely that looking at the history of emotion expression may help us gather 
insights into why certain events unfolded in the way they did (and therefore historians should pay 
more attention to it). Reddy’s study can then be seen as one initial attempt to put this method into 
practice.  
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To further our understanding of the effects of available labels and descriptions on feelings 
and behaviour, a good place to start could be the history of mood disorders. We know already, for 
example (see Jackson, 1986), that the English term “depression”, which started to feature in medical 
dictionaries in 1860, describes many of the symptoms that at the time of Hippocrates indicated 
melancholia; the latter term has been in use ever since to refer to a state of dejection and sorrow 
(see Burton, 1972). In medieval times, many of the features of modern depression were part of 
accidie (or acedia), the “noonday demon”—as John Cassian (ca. 360-435 AD) called it—namely, in 
Solomon’s (2002, p. 293) touching characterization, ‘the thing that you can see clearly in the 
brightest part of the day but that nonetheless comes to wrench your soul away from God’. Now, the 
terms “depression” and “melancholia” indicate physical processes. The former was originally 
devised from the Latin de (down from) and premere (to press), and has carried the meaning of 
“pressing down”; the latter is the Latin transliteration of the Greek term, which in turn derives from 
melaina chole, namely “black bile” (in humoural theory, the black bile was thought to be the 
principal etiological factor in melancholia). The term accidie, on the other hand, indicates a moral 
condition, a lack of something praiseworthy; it comes from the Greek a-kedia, which means “lack 
of care”, heedlessness. These differences of course reveal, and are a consequence of, different 
attitudes towards depression in different historical and social contexts; whereas depression and 
melancholia have been associated with medical conditions, accidie was a sin, an indication that one 
was not rejoicing in the certain knowledge of God’s love and mercy (Solomon, 2002). Yet the 
existence of labels with such different connotations would itself have contributed to deepening the 
gap between the medical and moral aspects of the condition. In medieval times, being classified as 
having melancholia rather than accidie would have led to a different treatment. There is evidence, 
in fact, that the recognition of the medical nature of the condition led to a relatively benevolent and 
empathetic attitude towards it (Jackson, 1986; Wenzel, 1967). Having accidie, on the contrary, was 
seen as a punishment of God himself (Solomon, 2002) and this judgment, we can speculate, would 
   
 
18  
have led those classified as accidiosi to experience their condition as profoundly disquieting and 
shameful, and perhaps also to try to disguise it. In the Renaissance, being melancholy was a sign of 
profundity, insight, and even genius (Solomon, 2002); melancholic people would have then 
behaved and felt very differently from medieval accidiosi—they could have indulged in their 
condition, and perhaps even cherished it as evidence of their perceptiveness. As Solomon remarks, 
by the end of the sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth ‘all those who believed 
themselves to be geniuses expected themselves to be melancholy. While men of real brilliance 
might suffer, those who hoped to be mistaken for brilliant men acted out suffering’ (op. cit., p. 299).  
A more detailed study, à la Hacking, of how changes in the classification, explanation and 
therapy of depression (as outlined e.g. in Jackson, 1986) have gone together with changes in the 
behaviour and experience of depressed people, and further historical accounts of mood disorders 
and emotions, would be one way of starting to explore the looping effects between emotion 
categories and human affect. 
 
6 Condensing and making accessible 
 
The power of language to transform people’s affective life eventually depends on the relatively 
trivial fact that language can easily direct attention to possibilities of experience that would 
otherwise go unnoticed. Naming emotions squeezes complex feelings into something compact, i.e. a 
word; complex feelings, once labelled, are more visible, and thus more easily and readily accessible 
than in the absence of the word (this point is analogous to the one Clark, 2008, makes in relation to 
labelling and visual perception; as he argues, labelling reduces the descriptive complexity of a 
scene, creates a new realm of perceptible objects, an thus creates new targets for selective 
attention).  
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This time, a cross-cultural comparison of poetry and emotion labels will help support this 
point. Several Japanese poems express the specific experience of remembering something that was 
once loved but is now lost, as e.g. in the following two works reported in Watts (1957, p. 187): 
 
 No one lives at the Barrier of Fuha; 
  The wooden penthouse is fallen away; 
 All that remains 
  Is the autumn wind.11 
 
 The evening haze;  
  Thinking of past things, 
   How far-off they are! 
   
The first poem in particular reminds me of a well-known piece by the Italian poet Eugenio 
Montale, “The House of the Customs Men”: 
 
 You won’t recall the house of the customs men 
 on the bluff that overhangs the reef: 
 it’s been waiting, empty, since the evening 
 your thoughts swarmed in  
 and hung there, nervously. 
 
 Sou’westers have lashed the old walls for years 
                                                
11 This is actually the first half of a poem by Fujiwara Yoshitune, reported also in Bownas & Twaite 
(1964, p. 103) in a different translation.   
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 and your laugh’s not careless anymore: 
 the compass needle wanders crazily 
 and the dice no longer tell the score.  
 You don’t remember: other times 
 assail your memory; a thread gets wound. 
 
 I hold one end still; but the house recedes 
 and the smoke-stained weathervane 
 spins pitiless up on the roof.  
 I hold on to an end; but you’re alone,  
 not here, not breathing in the dark.  
 
 Oh the vanishing horizon line,  
 where the tanker’s lights flash now and then! 
 Is the channel here? (The breakers 
 still seethe against the cliff that drops away …) 
 You don’t recall the house of this, my evening.  
 And I don’t know who’s going and who’ll stay.12 
 
Italian does not have a word for the complex experience evoked by this poem—a sorrowful 
and anguished awareness of the transient nature of human relationships and existence (which is 
different from nostalgia; the latter is a more personal and less existential feeling of missing 
something loved). Yet Japanese does have a label for it (or something very close to it), namely 
“mono no aware”, usually translated as the “pathos” or “sensitivity” (aware) “of things” (mono no). 
                                                
12 Translation by J. Galassi; see Montale (1998, p. 223). 
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Mono no aware was singled out in the 18th century by the literary theorist Motoori Norinaga as the 
predominant feature of the 11th century Japanese classic, the Genji (see Ikeda, 1979), and is still 
central in Japanese culture and aesthetics (Parkes, 2006). Scholars debate on the exact meaning of 
the term; yet they seem to agree that mono no aware is awareness of the transient nature of all 
things, ‘an emotional sense of the impermanence of life’ (Ikeda, 1979, p. 109). A classic example is 
the sense of the fleeting beauty of the cherry blossoms; Parkes (2006) also mentions the image 
(from Ozu’s film Late Spring) of a mirror reflecting the absence of the daughter who has just left 
home after getting married. This last image, together with the two short poems reported earlier, 
illustrate Watt’s definition of aware particularly well: ‘the echo of what has passed and what was 
loved, giving them a resonance such as a great cathedral gives to a choir, so that they would be the 
poorer without it’ (Watts, 1957, p. 186). 
For present purposes, it is interesting that several Japanese poems express aware (see for 
example the collections edited by Bownas & Twaite, 1964, and Stryk & Ikemoto, 1977), and that 
aware appears to be much more present in Japanese than in Italian poetry (Montale’s recurrent 
theme of the transience of life is distinctive of his own poetry). Aware, for example, is one of the 
four moods that traditionally prevails in a haiku, the three-line poem of seventeen syllables usually 
written by Zennists.13 Not only “official” poets and Zennists, but many lay people in Japan write 
haiku; most large towns have haiku clubs which publish quarterly magazines to which people from 
various professions and social classes contribute (Bownas, 1964). There are therefore relatively 
many occasions that allow people to express and experience aware (note the looping effect). 
My suggestion here is that the very existence of the word “aware” has contributed to the 
prominence of the experience of aware in Japanese poetry and, more broadly, Japanese aesthetics. 
                                                
13 The other three moods are sabi (quiet and deep solitude, loneliness, isolation), wabi (simple 
beauty, rustic patina), and yûgen (depth, mystery). Interestingly Watts (1957), Parkes (2006) and 
Stryk (1977) all give rather different translations of these terms. 
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Qua “material symbol” (Clark, 2008), the word flags the experience to which it refers, drawing 
attention to it; at the same time, the word is a simple and “cheap” (to borrow Clark’s term) way of 
indicating something complex that would otherwise need many words (and considerable skill) to be 
evoked (see Montale’s poem above). Once flagged and “condensed” by a label, the experience is 
more visible and accessible. Visibility and accessibility imply that people will enact, or try to enact, 
the experience more frequently, and that their behaviour (and most likely physiology as well) will 
change accordingly. (I myself, since learning about aware and exposing myself to works that evoke 
it, now perceive aware-affording situations more frequently than before.) Whoever aims at writing a 
haiku according to traditional rules, for example, will strive to evoke aware (or any of the other 
three experiences typical of the genre); this is because the word, by merely existing, presents the 
poet with a specific target.  
The suggestion, in sum, is that labels for emotions have causal force. They can act as 
catalysts for a complex of feelings that may otherwise go unnoticed. Also, they can channel and 
structure expressive resources towards a specific type of experience. This capacity is just another 
aspect of the power of labelling (discussed at length by Clark) to create objects that, once there, 
make it possible to attend to them and to develop second-order thoughts about them. As Clark 
(2008, p. 45) puts it, ‘the presence of the material symbol impacts behaviour […] by itself, qua 
material symbol, providing a new target for selective attention’; and paraphrasing his words, we can 
add that the act of labelling thus creates ‘a new realm of possible affective experiences’.  
 
7 Reinterpreting the “verbal overshadowing” effect 
 
I should at this point mention a possible objection and/or counterexample to the view that language 
enhances and enriches affective experience. Some psychologists have shown that, under certain 
conditions at least, providing verbal descriptions (of a face or a voice, for example) can impair 
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subsequent recognition of the item described. Schooler & Engstler-Schooler (1990) originally called 
this phenomenon verbal overshadowing. The conditions under which the phenomenon occurs are 
not fully understood, and different explanations of it have been provided (for an overview and meta-
analysis, see Meissner & Brigham, 2001). According to Schooler (2002) and Schooler & Schreiber 
(2004), verbalization induces a reflective attitude, which in turn leads to a fragmentation of the 
original experience; putting an experience into words thus makes subjects “lose touch” with its 
original holistic character (in fact, verbal overshadowing tends to occur specifically in the case of 
experiences that are difficult to put into words in the first place; see Schooler, 2002).  
Prima facie, this interpretation of the verbal overshadowing effect would seem to be in 
tension with the present suggestion that language can refine and enhance emotion experience. A 
closer look at the available empirical evidence, however, re-iterates the importance of having a 
sophisticated language for being able to enjoy rich experiences. Take for example Melcher & 
Schooler’s (1996) investigation of the effects of verbalization on wine tasting. Participants were 
divided into three groups: the Novices (people who drank red wine less than once per month), the 
Intermediates (people who drank red wine at least once per month), and the Experts (wine 
professionals or people who had taken several wine seminars). All participants had one minute to 
taste a target red wine; immediately after, subjects in the verbalization condition had 4 minutes to 
describe its flavour as precisely and in as much detail as possible (while “non-verbal” subjects 
solved crosswords). Afterwards, all participants were presented with four different samples of red 
wine, and had to recognize the one they had tasted earlier. Results interestingly showed that 
verbalization had different effects on wine recognition depending on the level of expertise of the 
participants: verbalization improved recognition of the target in the case of the Novices, impaired it 
in the case of the Intermediates, and did not affect it in the Experts. 
This result, as I interpret it, does not undermine the proposal that language can enrich one’s 
experience, but supports it instead. As Melcher & Schooler (1996, p. 240) themselves pointed out, 
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the Intermediates were characterized by a strong discrepancy between perceptual and verbal 
expertise. They resembled the Experts in terms of perceptual expertise (the non-verbal 
Intermediates’ discrimination was not significantly different from the Experts’ one), but were more 
like the Novices in terms of verbal expertise (they used less than half the number of formal wine 
terms than the Experts). One possible explanation of the Intermediates’ susceptibility to 
verbalization, therefore, is that their vocabulary was too poor to allow them adequately to describe 
their perception; their description of the target wine was thus not rich enough to allow them to 
remember it in all the details required to distinguish it from other wines. If they had had a richer 
vocabulary, they might have provided richer descriptions and therefore remembered flavours in a 
more detailed way.  
Indeed, training to become a wine expert involves learning how to talk about wine (see e.g. 
Bach, 2008). Wine talk has several functions, and one of them is precisely to refine perceptual 
discrimination by making the taster attend to features of the wine that would otherwise go 
unnoticed, and that it would be difficult to bring into reflective attention. Whereas, arguably, a more 
sophisticated discriminatory capacity does not necessary lead to a heightened enjoyment (Bach, 
2008), there is little doubt that learning how to describe a wine brings about a change in one’s 
experience and makes it more “granular”.  
 This interpretation differs from Melcher & Schooler’s (1996) in that it does not posit a 
disruptive effect of verbalization per se, but rather a disruptive effect of poor verbalization. In a 
(rather ambiguous) passage, Melcher & Schooler (1996, p. 240) wrote that ‘verbalization 
encourages an inopportune shift from the stronger foundation of their [= the subjects’] perceptual 
expertise to the shakier scaffolding of their developing wine vocabulary’. Read in the broader 
context of their discussion, this passage means that what is “inopportune” (i.e. a source of impaired 
recognition following verbalization) is the shift itself from a non-verbal perceptual experience to a 
verbal description— i.e. it is the act itself of putting into words. As Melcher & Schooler emphasize 
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in other passages, ‘verbalization can produce a generalized verbal ‘set’ that can systematically bias 
individuals to foreground verbal knowledge at the expense of perceptual knowledge’ (op. cit., p. 
241, my emphasis; see also Schooler, 2002, and Schooler & Schreiber, 2004).  
On the present interpretation, what is “inopportune” is rather the attempt to describe a rich 
and detailed perceptual experience with an impoverished and imprecise vocabulary. Putting a 
complex experience into words need not have a negative biasing effect; as Melcher and Schooler’s 
results in the case of the Experts suggests, possessing a vocabulary that is rich enough to do justice 
to a complex experience leaves the latter “unbiased”. This interpretation is consistent with the 
results of a later study by the same authors (see Melcher & Schooler, 2004), which showed that 
subjects who had received “conceptual training” on mushrooms did not show verbal overshadowing 
of mushroom recognition, and even appeared to benefit from the training. The conceptual training 
consisted in a 35-minute lecture providing, among others, fundamentals of mushroom morphology, 
visible features and characteristics used for classification, pictures, drawings, and some technical 
vocabulary used in describing various shapes and parts of mushrooms; subjects were also instructed 
to take notes during the lecture. Following the training, they recognized mushrooms better than 
subjects who had only received “perceptual training” i.e. had learnt to categorize mushrooms non-
verbally. In addition, results suggested that conceptually trained subjects had even benefited from 
the training.14 
                                                
14 To be precise, Melcher & Schooler (2004) discuss two experiments. In both of them, subjects in 
the conceptual training condition listened and watched the lecture; only in the second experiment, 
however, were they explicitly told to take notes. Results of the first experiment did not show a 
significant verbal overshadowing of mushroom recognition in these subjects (only a trend towards 
it); results of the second experiment not only clearly showed a lack of verbal overshadowing 
following conceptual training, but also a (marginally) significant facilitation of perceptual 
recognition. See Melcher & Schooler (2004) for further details, discussion and caveats. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
Language, as the foregoing discussion is meant to show, can act on feelings in many different ways. 
It can merely report (i.e. describe) specific affective experiences that pre-exist verbalization; as 
such, it is an important tool for interpersonal communication (section 2). Yet it can also modify 
one’s feelings. Putting one’s experiences into words can help a fuzzy pre-reflective feeling to 
become explicit, and this passage from the pre-reflective to the reflective level of awareness can 
trigger new experiences (such as a sense of fulfilment) that further contribute to transforming the 
original feeling (section 3). Language can also act as a device that pulls the mind “from outside”, by 
signposting and recommending possibilities of experience. This power of language has explicitly 
been acknowledged and exploited for creative-artistic purposes (section 4), but it is also (more or 
less) tacitly exerted in our everyday talk about feelings. As interactive kinds, we are influenced by 
the way in which we are classified; thus, at any place and time, available emotion labels, most 
common modalities of emotion expression, and predominant attitudes towards them, are likely to 
influence our experience and behaviour. Emotion talk contributes to creating niches in which 
specific feelings can flourish (section 5). Ultimately, the capacity of language to mould our feelings 
depends largely on the easiness with which labels can flag possibilities of experience. Words are 
cheap ways to make feelings—including complex ones—visible and accessible (section 6). 
Possessing a label for a certain experience can thus turn out to be a very effective way of entraining 
the affective lives of several individuals. 
 The various ways in which language acts on feelings distinguished here are, of course, not 
independent, and overlap in several respects; thus, for example, the power of words to enhance 
affect and induce novel experiences exploits, partly at least, the capacity of language to make 
explicit feelings that would otherwise remain tacit and/or unacknowledged. Because language is 
   
 
27  
such a ubiquitous phenomenon in our life, and because it is something we do as well as something 
done to us, we cannot expect that the influences it exerts on our emotion experience will take place 
in isolation from one another. Still, I hope that the distinctions drawn here have managed to flash 
out what a versatile resource language is, not only when it comes to solving problems and storing 
information, but also when impinging on that most central feature of our mind, its affective and 
feeling dimension.  
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